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PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 9 J st CONGRESS1 SECOND SESSION 
WASHINGTON, SATURDAY, JANUARY 24, 1970 No.6 
House of Representatives 
The House was not 1n session today. Ita next meeting will be held on Monday, January 26, 1970, at 12 o'clock noon. 
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Senate 
SATURDAY, JANUARY 24, 1970 
tlon of S. 30, I had some words to say 
about ccrtn.in Members who participated 
in that debate, notably the Senator from 
Arkansas (Mr. McCLELLAN), the Senator 
in charge of the bill. 
- Through inadvertence, I forgot to 
mention the outstanding efforts of the 
distinguished Senator from Nebraska 
(Mr. HRUSKA), the ranking member of 
the Judiciary Committee and good right 
hand of the Senator from Arkansas in 
consideration of the bill which had been 
considered for the previous 3 days and 
which passed the Senate yesterday. 
At this time I wish to extend to the 
Senator from Nebraska my thanks for 
his diligence, for his integrity, for h.is 
knowledge, and for the continual efforts 
he made not only during the 3-day de-
bate but also over the past year in help-
ing to bring outS. 30. 
I would feel remiss if the RECORD did 
not show, in addition to those men-
tioned by me yesterday, my personal 
appreciation to the distinguished Sena-
tor from Nebraska for the contributions 
he made to the consideration of this 
most Important bill. 
SENATE RESOLUTION 292-
U.S. FORCES IN EUROPE 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, on 
yesterday, I made a speech relative to 
Senate Resolution 292, a resolution seek-
ing to bring about a substantial reduc-
tion of U.S. troops and dependents in 
Europe, which together number some-
where In the vicinity of 600,000, almost 
a quarter of a century after World War 
n ended. 
At that time, I brought out some state-
ments made by the President of the 
United States In his address on the state 
of the Union to Congress assembled in 
the Hall of the House of Representa-
tives on Thursday last. 
In the RECORD, it 1s carried as a sepa-
rate statement, which I do not mind, 
because It points up what he said and it 
also empha.~lzcs the fact that I approved 
thoroughly of what he had to say in the 
field of foreign policy. 
But what I intended to do was to show 
the relationship between the excerpts 
from the President's statement in the 
foreign policy field and the situation 
which confronts us in Europe where we 
have, as I have indicated, roughly 600,000 
troops, dependents, and civilian em-
ployees a quarter of a century after the 
end of World War II. 
I had hoped to develop a continuity 
which could be used In answers to ques-
tions. So, Mr. Preside11t, In view of the 
fact that this was not done as I had 
anticipated, I ask unanimous consent 
that, following the news story from 
Frankfurt in West Germany, which I 
incorporated in the RECORD, my remarks 
relative to President Nixon's state of the 
Union message as It affects foreign pol-
icy be incorporated not only in the per-
manent RECORD but also in the RECORD 
today and that it all be reprinted as 
spoken at that time. 
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. With-
out objection it Is so ordered. 
SENATE RESOLUTION 292-U.S. 
FORCES IN EUROPE 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, In 
the New York Times of Janua ry 21, 1970, 
on page 4, there is published an excerpt 
from a speech by Under Secretary of 
State Richardson in Chicago, telling us 
how the European countties, our allies, 
especially Germany, are hoping to offset 
the balance-of-payments drain on our 
mllitary deployment in Europe and 
how we are exploring ways and means 
of making this arrangement more 
adequate. 
In that same issue of the New York 
Times, on page 64, an article states that 
Germany has just cashed 1n prematurely 
a billion marks' worth of U.S. Treasury 
s 491 
I 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 45, Folder 56, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
8492 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE January 2.~, 1970 
bonds purchased in 1968 to oliset the 
drain caused by the stationing of Amer-
ican troops in West Germany. 
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent to have the article entitled "Ger-
many recalls Bonds of United States 
Early" printed in the RECORD. 
There being no objection, the article 
was ordered to be printed In the RECORD, 
as follows: 
0FRMANY RECALLS BONDS OF UNITED STATES 
EARLY 
FRANKFURT, WEST GERMANY, January 20.-
The Bundesbank disclosed today that It has 
prematurely recalled a billlon marks of 
United States Treasury Bonds purchased .In 
1968 to otrset the dollar drain caused by 
the stationing of American troops In West 
Germany. 
Under the 1968 otrset agreement with the 
United States Government. West Germany 
had acquired $500-milllon worth or 4 Y. -year 
Treasury bonds for 2 billion marks. 
The premature recall was made to help In-
crease the West German Central Bank's own 
liquldlty In foreign currency, a Bundesbank 
official explained. 
Because of the Inflow of dollars resulting 
from the transaction. West German foreign 
currency reserves Increased 536.400.000 marks 
to 5,928,891,000 m arks on bal£Ulce In the week 
ended Jnn. 15, Bundesbank reported. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, on 
yesterday, the President of the United 
States delivered his state of the Union 
message to a joint session of the 
Congress. 
It was a fine message. It was a mes-
sage with a lot of merit to it. CertainlY 
the meat will be there when the specifics 
are forthcoming to cope with the recom-
mendations and goals, which President 
Nixon has outlined. 
During the course of that speech he 
said, speaking of foreign policy: 
Today, let me describe the directions or 
our new pollcles. 
We have based our policies on an evalua-
tion of the world as It Is, rather than as It 
was twenty-five years ago at the end of 
World War II. Many of the policies which 
were necessary and right then are obsolete 
today. 
Then, beca use ot America's overwhelming 
military and economic strength, the weak-
ness of other mnjor free world powers and 
the lnab1llty or scoree of newly Independent 
nations to defend- let alone govern-them-
selves, America had to assume the major 
burden for the defense or freedom In the 
world. 
In two wars, first In Korea nnd then In 
Vlet!1Mll, we furnished most of the money, 
m ost of the n•ms and most ot the men to 
help others defend their freedom. 
Today the grent Industrial nntlons of 
Europe, as well as Japan, have regained 
their economic strength, and the nations of 
Latin Amerlc~nd many ot the nations 
that n.cqulred their freedom from colonial· 
Ism after World War II In Asia and Africa-
have a new sense ot pride a.nd dignity, and 
a detennlnatlon to assume the responslblllty 
tor their own defense. 
That Is the basis ot the doctrine I an· 
nounced at Guam. 
If I may interpolate there, the Guam 
declaration formed the basis of the Nix-
on doctrine, which I wholeheartedly en-
dorse and which I was pleased to see the 
President annoWlce yesterday applied 
not only to Asia but to the rest' of the 
wurld as well, 
Continuing the President's remarks: 
Neither the defense nor the development 
ot other nations ca.n be exclusively or pri-
marily an American undertaking; 
The nations of each part of the world 
should assume the primary respon.slbillty for 
their own well-being; and they themselves 
should determine the terms of that well-
being. 
To Insist that other nations play a role Is 
not n retreat from responslblllty, but a shar-
Ing of responsibility. 
We shall be faithful to our treaty commit-
ments, but we shall reduce our Involvement 
and our presence In other nations' arratrs. 
Mr. President, to that I say, "Amen." 
Mr. President, on January 20, the 
Under Secretary of State, the Honorable 
Elliot' L. Richardson, examined U.S. re-
lations with Western Europe, in general, 
and the question of U.S. force levels in 
Europe, in particular, in an. address be-
fore the Chicago Council on Foreign Re-
lations. At the beginning of his speech, 
Mr. Richardson referred to the resolu-
tion I submitted to the Senate on Decem-
ber 1, Senate Resolution 292, which calls 
for "a substantial reduction of U.S. forces 
permanently stationed in Europe." 
In Introducing that resolut.ion on 
December 1, I made a statement on the 
floor of the Senate setting forth the rea-
sons that I thought justified a downward 
adjustment of the level of our forces in 
Europe. I pointed to the enormous costs 
involved in maintaining a Military Es-
tablishment of 3.5 million men under 
arms with 1.2 million men outside the 
United States and over 300,000 of these-
together with 235,000 dependents and 14,-
000 U.S. civilian employees-in Western 
Europe. I pointed to the fact that our 
net foreign exchange gap with Germany 
is runnil1g at about $965 mlllion a year, 
and I should note parenthetically that 
Mr. Richardson reminded his Chicago 
audience that--
The balance-of-payments drain of our 
military deployment In Europe Is currently 
about $1.5 billion a year. 
I also pointed to the need to reduce 
our military budget from its present level 
of somewliere between $75 and $80 bil-
lion. 
Mr. Richardson has now given the ad-
ministration's arguments for maintain-
Ing the status quo, as far as our force 
levels In Europe are concerned. There 
are, of course, two sides to every argu-
ment. I presented one side on the Senate 
floor on December 1. The Under Secre-
tary of State presented the other in Chi-
cago on January 20. I hope that my 
colleagues in the Senate, those in the 
other body, and members of the public 
will examine the two sides of the argu-
ment closely. 
In this connection, and in order to 
avoid repeating what I have already said 
on the floor of the Senate, I ask unani-
mous consent that the full text of Mr. 
Richardson's speech, and the full text of 
my December 1 statement, be printed 
In the RECORD at the conclusion of my 
remarks. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. 
CRANSTON in the chair), Without objec-
tion, it Is so ordered. 
<See exhibit 1.) 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I con-
sider it necessary to make a few com-
ments today, on Mr. Richardson's speech. 
in order to make my position clear: 
First of all, Mr. Richardson referred 
to Senate Resolution 292 as an expres-
sion of the "tendency by some to say 
that NATO has done its job, so why not 
bring those troops home?" May I point. 
out that Senate Resolution 292 is not an 
expression of a belief that. "NATO has 
done its job" but, on the contrary, of a 
,belief that the United States has been 
doing a disproportionate share of NATO's 
job and that the other 14 members of 
NATO are in a position to do more and 
should do so. Nor does Senate Resolu-
tion 292 urge that all U.S. troops be 
brought home but only !.hat there be a 
"substantial reduction of U.S. forces per-
manently stationed in Europe." 
Second, Mr. Richardson states that 
the eiTectiveness of the strategy of flexi-
ble reasons "rests perforce on the con-
viction in both parts of Europe that the 
United States will fulfill its detennined 
role." Mr. Richardson added that " the 
U.S. military presence in Europe, 
whether we like IL or not, continues to be 
taken as tangible evidence of our com-
mitment" and that "any sudden or dra-
matic reduction" of that presence would 
have " unpleasant consequences." 
I would like to emphasize that Senate 
Resolution 292 neither states nor implies 
that we will not fulfill our NATO obli-
gations. On the contrary, it affirms spe-
cifically that a substantial reduction of 
U.S. forces permanently stationed in 
Europe can be made "without adversely 
affecting either our resolve or ability to 
meet our commitment under the North 
Atlantic Treaty." Furthermore, the reso-
lution does not urge, and I have not 
urged, that such a substantial reduction 
be either "sudden" or "dramatic." Mr. 
Richardson did not argue against a "sud-
den" or "dramatic",reduction but against 
any reduction at all, for only a few para-
graphs later he referred to the admin-
istration's having "pledged to maintain 
our present troop strength in Europe 
through fiscal year 1971." 
Third, Mr. Richardson stated that if 
"all of our forces in Europe were brought 
home and stationed in this country, lit-
tle or no savings would appear In our 
defense budget." As I noted in my De-
cember 1 statement, however, It has al-
ways been argued that bringing a sub-
stantial number of forces back from 
Europe will not aliect our defense budget 
because we cannot reduce the number of 
men under arms. But it is also argued 
that It Is impossible to reduce the num-
ber of men under arms, among other 
reasons because of the need to maintain 
present force levels in Europe. I con-
tended then, and I do so again now, that 
this endless circle, which will lead in the 
end to fiscal exhaustion, can and must 
be broken. 
Fourth, Mr. Richardson referred to the 
possibility of negotiating with the Soviet 
Union and the countries of Eastern Eu-
rope mutual and balanced force reduc-
tions and said that the other reason th'! 
administration opposCB Senate Rcwlu-
' '\ '·l 
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tion 292 is "the firm belief that it would 
weaken our bargaining position." 
Mr. President, NATO has been study-
ing mutual and balanced forced reduc-
t ions for years and has still not arrived 
at an agreed proposal. Even when such a 
proposal is formulated, there is no rea-
son to assume that negotiations will 
· begin for it is my understanding that 
t here has been no indication that the 
Soviet Union is interested in such nego-
tin tions. And what if that continues to 
be the situation? Will we then be locked 
in to maintaining our present force levels 
in Europe in perpetuity regardless of the 
• costs involved or the wisdom of doing so 
1n the light of our national interests? 
In fact, the Soviets may not be willing 
to reduce the military presence in 
Eastern Europe no matter what the 
United States docs or docs not do be-
cause the level of that presence may well 
be dictated by political considerations 
within Eas tern Europe. On the other 
h and, U that is not so, then U.S. reduc-
t ions may be the most cfiectlve way to 
brinrr about Soviet reductions because the 
Soviet Union could no longer justify the 
presence of hundreds of thousands of 
Soviet troops in Eastern Europe on the.. 
ground that there were hundreds of 
thousands of American troops in Western 
Europe. 
Fifth. Mr. Richardson stated that "the 
bulk of any substantial reduction in U.S. 
forces will have to be made up by West 
Germany, the most populous and 
wealthy of our allies ." He went on to 
say that the Getman people and the 
Soviet Union do not favor a larger Ger-
man military establishment and that 
such a development "would give pause 
even to some of Germany's allies." -
I am not arguing that there should be 
a la rger German military establishment 
than has been agreed to before but only 
tha t the West Germans meet their pre-
determined NATO commitments as we 
h ave met ours. I might say, parentheti-
cally, that the same comment pertains to 
other NATO countries as well. The fact 
1s that in terms of the percentage of 
armed forces to men of military age, in 
many NATO countries that percentage 
1s not only below the 8.7 percent found 
1n the United States but also below the 
4-percent figure which applies to West 
Germany. And in all of the NATO coun-
tries that have compulsory military serv-
ice-except Greece, Portugal, and Tur-
key-the period of service is shorter than 
it is In the United States. In the case of 
Canada, Luxembourg, and the United 
Kingdom, there is no compulsory mili-
tary service at all. I would also like to 
point out that the United Kingdom with 
a population of 55.5 m!llion, and Italy, 
with a popula tion of 53.7 million, are 
almost as populous as West Germany 
with a population of 58.5 million. Fur-
thermore, according to the Institute for 
Strategic S tudies in London, Britain's 
1969- 70 defense budget of $5.4 billion 
was higher than Germany's 1969 defense 
budget of $5.3 billion. On the other 
hand, Italy's 1969 defense budget was 
only $1.9 billion. 
Finally, it 1s all very well to talk about 
1.h l' "l'trenJrth, clo~nC'!:.". tm~t. rcA.IIsm., 
>s.::·.~ ':' t,\. ": • .'. l:t ~ ol ~.\ 1\.\ !U ~ll'. H.lvJI, 
a.rdoon did in his concluding paragrapl\. 
But it seems to me that there is a con-
trast between these words and the fact 
that the 250 million people of Western 
Europe, with tremendous industrial re-
sources and long military experience, are 
unable to organize an effective military 
coalition to defend themselves against 
200 million Russians, who are contending 
at the same time with 800 million Chi-
nese, but must continue after 20 years to 
depend on 200 million Americans for 
their defense. The status quo has been 
safe and comfortable for our European 
allies. But, as I observed on December 1, 
it has made the Europeans less interested 
in their own defense, has distorted the 
relationship between Europe and the 
United States, and has resulted in a 
drain on our resources which has ad-
versely affected our ab!llty to deal with 
the urgent problems we face at home. 
EJa-llBIT 1 
AnonESS BY HON. ELr.lOT L . RICHARDSON, UNDEn 
SECRETARY or STATE, BEFOIU!: THE CJUCAGO 
CoUNCIL oN FoREIGN RELAnONS, CHICAGO, 
ILL. 
I would like today to examine one of tho 
most !un<lnrncntnl o! our !orelgn policy con-
cerns, and one which In some ways 18 too 
much taken !or granted, It not overlooked-
tale United States relationship 1x> Western 
Europe and Western European security. 
In a reverse twist on the early days o! the 
Republic when George Washington used to 
preach against yielding to "the lnsld1ous 
wiles" of Europe's Influence, our baste ties to 
Wes tern Europe are now eo firmly estn.bl1shed 
that comment!U'y on the subject l.s regarded 
as a tiresome reatllrm.a tlon of the obvious. 
Whereas President Washington warned 
that European controversle6 were "essentially 
foreign to our concerns" Presldelllt Nlxon wn.s 
moved to observe on NATO's birthday last 
spring that many people now find NATO 
"quaint and famJ11ar and a bit old fashioned." 
To much o! tale publlc the purposes oi 
NATO have the character of a cUche. The very 
Climate of securlty which NATO has fostered 
hM, perversely, seemed to pcrrn.lt many to 
disregard It or to think It obsolete. In the 
wake of the re-examination oi !oretgn oom-
mibnents occasioned by the VIet-Nam war, 
there Is a tendency by some to say that NATO 
has done Its job, oo why not bring those 
troops home? In the U.S. Senate this !eellng 
has taken concrete poll tical expre6Sion In the 
form of a resolution Introduced by Senator 
Mansfield, one o! the most thoughtful stu-
dents or America's role In world a!Ia lrs. IDs 
resolution calls !or "substantial reductions" 
of U .S. forces In Europe. 
Meanwhile, Western Europe 1tseu, pros-
perous, mostly democratic, stable, and prob-
ably more secure than at any time In its 
modern history, has been preoccupied with 
the inevitable problems that are the by-
product o! a.tiluence and rapid economic 
growth. These concerns seem to have caused 
it to drift somewhat from the lofty goals of 
a Un1flect Europe and Atlantic partnership 
which gave a sense o! mlsslon to Its leader-
ship two decades ago. 
, On both sides of the Atlantic then, there 
are fee lings of oomplacency and a restless 
anticipation or new events. The memory o! 
Ozechoslovak.la Is fading, the Brezhnev Doc-
trtne is dimmer, and a reduced sense o! 
danger merges with the feeling that new 
ln1tatives are both called for and Inevitable. 
Perhaps In response to this atmosphere the 
Warsaw Pact nations, led by the Soviet Union, 
have called !or the convocation of a European 
Security Con!erence, although- ironically-
their suggested agenda would not even touch 
the l>M.Ic II'Su ea or Europ~n.n e<'<lurl ty. 
l11 Ull• »llllt>lh\11," lo, I lhlnk, W"t'l.hwh11e 
w ~ake a lNBh look a~ t.he lllJ>l)()ftiiJona on. 
which our European policy resls, to examine 
Its continuing validity, and to appraise 
!rankly and realistically the propooals being 
made for change and adjustment. 
Two World Wars have led t he American 
people to perceive with great cla rity that t he 
security of the United States is directly linked 
to the security of Western Europe. 
Pursuant to this belle!, whlel1 was formal-
Ized In the North Atlantic Treaty of 1049, 
the United S La tes has maintained a major 
military es ta blishment on European so11 since 
the early 1950's. U.S. nuclear power as well 
as conventional forces are available In sup-
port of this treaty commitment. Although 
Europe Is n ow Incomparably s tronger t han It 
was when this arrangement was first con-
tracted, Its ultimate security, llke our own, 
continues to be llnkect to our power and 
nuclear deterrence. Because or this, one or 
President Nixon's first acts upon tak.lng office 
wn.s t.o reaffirm the American commitment to 
NATO and to promise ciooo and coniJnulng 
cons ultation within the Alliance. 
Deterrence Is a GUbtle concept. Its reality 
takes form largely ln the minds of thooe who 
might be contemplating aggression. It Is ef-
fective only when they conclude tha t any 
possible adva ntnges o! aggression would be 
o!Tsct by Its predictable cost~. 
NATO's atrn.tcgy of flexible respo nse Is cal-
culated to Insure tha t any potential aggreR-
sor would come to just this conclusion. 
Our conventional forces arc maintained In 
position in Europe to r esis t possible a ttack 
by Wmsaw Pact formations. They are meant 
also to deter piecemeal aggression which an 
enemy might be temp~d to conclude he 
oould get away with U the only alternative 
to our capitulation were the unleashing or 
nuclea r war. These forces o.re supported by a 
broad arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons, 
available !or use U the Intensit y or the 
aggression rises. 
The entire effectiveness o! the flexible re-
sponse strategy rests perforce on the convic-
tion In both pa rts of Europe that the United 
States will fulfill Its determined role. And 
the United States military presence In Eur-
ope, whether we like It or not, continues to 
be taken as tangible evidence o! our com-
mit ment. 
We must face the fact, therefore, that any 
sudden or dramatic reduction In the United 
States military presence in Europe would 
have unpleASant consequences ot two kinds. 
First, as a practical m111tary matter, NATO's 
conventional defenses would be significantly 
weakened. Other NATO members might be 
tempted to follow suit and cut forces further. 
In the event or aggression, a less powerful 
NATO Alllenoe might be driven to resort. 
more quickly to nuclear weapons. 
Secondly, and of probably greater oonsc-
quence, any sudden or major withdrawal of 
American forces would have a distinctly de-
stabilizing eaect on the European scene. 
The structure o! the Alllance, na Indeed 
the C!lltlre structure of world order which 
we have helped erect since the war, rests 
In the final analysis on the shared confidence 
that we shall honor our oonunltmcnts. 
U that confidence Is eroded a rapid d e-
terioration can occur-a. deterioration not 
unlike that which can send prices on the 
stock market plummeting. And for this ren-
son It l.s doubly necessary that we not light ly 
or hastily make moves that might under-
mine confidence In the strength of our S1Ip-
port. It Is for this renaon that we h ave 
pledged to maintain our presen t troop 
strength 1n Europe through Fiscal Yea.r 1971. 
Let me stress that none o! this suggests 
that U.S. troops w111 have to remain In Eu-
rope at present strength forever and ever. 
Certaln1y we hope that future conditions will 
allow modlflcatlons of our role. Our current 
force level In Europe of 310,000 men already, 
ln fp.ot, roprrr.•nt~ " orms;lf!orn.ble drop fr'>m 
1.1111 11Nt-k ,,, ~f.rll ,fJ(II tu )~~~~ 1 Jtit.'t •.-.. -' !'".t-J 
viet war of n<' J ves 1111 11<11'1111. We are flltiO con-
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tlnuaJly studying and trying to Improve th\) 
means by which troops stationed . in the. 
Unlted States can be rapidly returne<l to Eu-
rope In case of crisis. The Mansfield Resolu-
tion urges that greater use be made of this 
redeployment option. 
Our studies show, however, that under 
present conditions front-line forces hastily 
returned to Europe In time of crisis could 
not carry out their mission with the same 
errectlveness as forces already in place. :.\.!-
though rapid redeployment of limited forces 
Is feasible, large-scale efforts of this sort ex-
pose these forces to hazards and potential 
confusion. 
Moreover, financial savings would be negli-
gible. If, for example, all of our current forces 
In Europe were brought home and stationed 
In this country, little or no savings would 
appear In our defense budget. We might 
even have to send a bit more, because we 
would lose significant financial advantages. 
In Germany, t he Federal Government 
makes land, bou.sllng, facUlties and services 
ava!lable to our forces at no cost, or at re-
duced costs. Duplicating such facUlties and 
support in the United States would Involve 
a heavy and continuing expense-one rough-
ly cancelling out savings In shortened sup-
ply l!nes and transportation costs to Europe. 
The balance-of-payments drain of our 
m1litary deployment In Europe Is currently 
about $1.5 billion a year. This is unquestion-
ably a large figure, and, I! our forces were 
returned to this country, many of those dol-
lars would stay at home. The problem is 
partially neutralized, however, by offset ar-
rangements with the European countries, 
particularly Germany and we are exploring 
means of maklng these arrangements more 
adequate. In addition, withdrawal of our 
force from Europe would be likely to evoke 
prompt countervailing effects, notably In re-
duced sales of military equipment to our 
Allles and in general exports to those coun-
tries. 
If we have not neglected the consideration 
of means by which our presence In Europe 
could be streamlined or modified without 
damaging the essential structure of the Alli-
ance, neither have we Ignored the opportu-
nities which the era of negotiation we have 
now entered may hold for the future. In 
this area we must a lso make meticulous and 
balanced judgments, taking care not to allow 
our efforts to bring about agreements with 
the Soviet Union to undermine our relations 
with our friends In Western Europe. 
We must have a proper regard for the al-
ways latent fear that agreements will be 
reached detrimental to European interests. 
We cannot, of course, allow the existence 
of this fear to deter u.s from seeklng to lower 
tensions. Ironically, In fact, there exists 
among a younger generation of Europeans 
the converse suspicion that the United States 
and the USSR are collaborators In the de-
fense of the status quo. But we Intend to do 
everything possl ble to allay such fears and 
suspicions by sticking strictly to our pledge 
to consult closely with our allies and take 
their Interests Into account as talks go for-
ward. Only by such close consultation can we 
quiet the Cassandras who see every etrort at 
US-Soviet rapprochement or even minor 
moves to adjust force levels as evidence of· 
betrayal. 
During the past year In-depth consulta-
tions have been held on a wide range of sub-
jects, including the question of strategic arms 
llmltatlons. The Deputy Foreign Ministers 
of the NATO governments, at President Nix-
on's suggestion, held the first of what we 
expect to be periodic reviews of major, long-
range problems before the Alllance. 
lt Is particularly Important that there 
be the fullest consultations on the SALT 
talks. The very fact that these talks are going 
on has stimulated some uneasiness In Eu-
rope. It le well undcrst<>od that t.he tnlka 
JlriiHtt· ~ltt..rrtr•~ str&begl~ nlaUru1s.hlps 1111t1 
that their success could further atrect the 
situation. As President Nixon put it last 
spring: "The West does not have the massive 
nuclear predominance today that It once 
had, e.nd any sort of broad-based arms agree-
ment with the Soviets would codify the pres-
ent balance." 
Given the European sensitivities on SALT 
and nervousness about changing military 
relationships, It would seem wise not to 
compound anxieties at this time by any 
moves to reduce our troop strength on the 
con tlnen t. 
While attempting to keep our allies abreast 
of our own negotiating activities, we are 
welcoming and encouraging their own ef-
forts, particularly those of West Germany, 
to improve relations with the Soviet Union 
and the countries of Eastern Europe. One 
of the most promising areas of potential 
progress with the Eastern European nations 
lies, we belleve, in reaching agreement on 
mutual and balanced East-West force re-
ductions. 
We are now working with our allles to 
develop models which could form the basis 
for such an agreement. The NATO countries 
Foreign Ministers, meeting last December, 
said In their Declaration that despite the 
fact that there had been no response on 
earller suggestions, the Allles "will continue 
their studies in order to prepare a realistic 
basis for active exploration at an early date." 
They concluded their studies on the sub-
ject had already progressed sufficiently to 
permit the establishment of criteria which 
reductions should meet. They directed that 
further consideration also go forward on 
related measures such as advance notifica-
tion of military movements or maneuvers, 
the exchange of observers at maneuvers, and 
the establlshment of observation posts. This, 
we are convinced, Is a constructive ap-
proach much more specifically, directed at 
a concrete Issue generating tension than 
t he Warsaw Pact's vague proposal for a 
European Security Conference. 
We hope the Warsaw Pact nations will re-
spond. Reallsm, however, suggests that they 
wlll be less likely to respond if a unilateral 
reduction of U.S. forces appears In the offing 
anyway. The firm belle! that It would weaken 
our bargaining position on balanced force re-
duction Is thus another reason why the Ad-
ministration opposes the Mansfield Resolu-
tion. 
Among the questions raised by those who 
favor an Immediate and substantial r educ-
tion of our forces in Europe Is whether the 
burden of NATO defense is now fairly allo-
cated. The prosperous Europeans should, they 
feel, carry a much larger share of the de-
fense of their own continent. 
We agree-up to a point. The United States 
believes that our European allies can and 
should do more. We have told them often 
that I! they Increase their own efforts, it 
would help us to maintain ours. So even 
though they actually have Increased their 
defense budgets to cover Improvements in 
their forces, while our own defense budget 
has been declining, we have and are continu-
Ing to press them to assume a larger share 
of Europe's defense responsibilities. 
A precipitate reduction of United States 
forces In Europe would, however, not only 
fail to stimulate additional European effort, 
It would probably produce the contrary ef'-
fect. The bulk of any substantial reductions 
In U.S. forces would have to be made up by 
West Germany, the most populous and 
wealthiest of our NATO allies. But the Ger-
man people do not relish an enlargement of 
their country's military establishment. Nor 
certainly does a soviet Union still highly 
emotional about Its 20 milllon World War II 
dead and enormously sensitive on the subject 
or German "revanchlsm." Indeed, it would 
give pause even to some of Germany's allies. 
Any ln•IRnlficrmt rlso In tho Oormrm tlo-
f~n~l' 1\lh>rt ooul!l thus !IOAtroy Ohn.noollor 
Brandt's constructive efforts to Improve rela-
tionships with the Federal Republic's Eastern 
neighbors and thereby bait the attempts to 
lay the foundation for a settlement or the 
Issues stlll dividing Europe. 
I spoke earller of the fact that we did not 
want to suggest that· the present number of 
U.S. troops In Europe was Inviolate and could 
or would never be changed. We hope that 
contlltlons will eventually come about which 
wlll render their presence altogether un-
necessary. But when such conditions do 
come, I feel certain they will be the result 
of hard and patient bargaining. 
Back In 1948, when the Cold War was very 
cold Indeed, Belgian Foreign Minister Paul 
Henri Spank, addressing hlmselr to the So-
viets' Andre Vyshlnsky at a UN Security 
Council session, said: "The basis of our 
pollcy today in Europe Is fear. We are afraid 
of you. We are afraid of your government and 
we are afraid of the policies which you are 
pursuing." 
Twenty-two years later tensions are lower 
and East and West are engaged In substan-
t ive discussions aimed at lowering them 
further. But the basic cement holdlng to-
gether the Alliance Is still the threat from 
the East. The United States does not control 
the Alliance. When France chose to with-
draw from NATO we could not prevent It 
from doing so. Unllke the Warsaw Pact which 
r ests on an Ideological base guarded and 
sanctified by the Soviet Union, NATO has no 
dogmatic underpinnings. There Is no Western 
version of' the Brczhnev Doctrine. When there 
is no more threat to the securl ty of the na-
tions of Western Europe, there will be no 
more need for NATO. And only when the con-
frontation in Europe truly ends ancl a genu-
ine peace replaces the always precarious 
peace of mutual deterrence will the role of 
our troops be finally accompllshed. 
On another front, in response to the Presi-
dent's Initiative, the Alliance has 't.c"tken on 
a new dimension by creating a permanent 
Committee on the Challenges of Modern 
Society to help deal constructively with some 
of' the most pressing problems common to 
all of its members-the problems of· the en-
vironment. 
The United States, meanwhile, continues 
to support the goal of a politically and eco-
nomically Integrated Europe. Despite the re-
cent signs of drift, economic Integration has 
come far, and there are indications that new 
moves forward may be developing. The most 
ambitious of the European regional arrange-
ments-the European Community of the 
Six-has already gone beyond the earller con-
ception of International cooperation to a new 
form of relationship among nation states. 
Since the EEC was established In 1958 Its 
members have abolished tarlfTs among them-
selves, agreed upon Important measures of 
the harmonization, instituted an runbltious 
common agricultural policy and removed 
most barriers to the free movement of capital 
and labor. As a group the Six have enjoyed 
significantly higher rates of economic ac-
tivity, trade and growtli than before 1956. 
Inter-Community t r ade has almost quad-
rupled. Since 1967 Community trade with the 
outside world hns exceeded that of the United 
States. 
The recent Summit Conference of the Six 
at the Hague and the success of the Council 
of Ministers of the Community In agreeing 
on a far-reaching plan for financing their 
common agricultural policy preface moves to 
perfect the economic union and extend It to 
new members in the next year or two. On 
the latter point, the Interests of the United 
States are very_ much engaged, not only 
economically but militarily, for enlargement 
of the European communities to admit coun-
tries not comml tted to the defense of the 
West raises questions about the pos.~lbllitles 
or pf>lltlcal 11l11ty, 0.11rl th"' IJT.tl•~\7' 'Ill 
ntron«l,ll or til~ HATO A!11'.lrl<Je itst lf. 
"" ·' 
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The Unl ted Sta tes sees no confilct between 
the gonl of European Integration and the 
effor ts n ow going forward to end the dan-· 
gerou s and Increasingly anachronistic divi-
sio n of the Continent. We welcome the In-
dication tha t dissatisfaction over the con-
tinuing gulf between the two halves of Eu-
rope Is growing In the East as well. Stronger 
rclntlonshlps In Weslcrn Europe Itself can, 
we belleve, fncllltnte the bulldlng of strong-
er relation ships with the cast. 
"I belleve we must bulld an Alliance," the 
President has said, "strong enough to deter 
those who would threaten war; close enough 
to provide for continuous and far-reaching · 
consultation; trusting enough to accept 
diversity of views; realistic enough to deal 
with the world as It Is; flexible enough to ex-
plore new channels of constructive coopern-
tlo n.'' 
In the past yenr, I believe, we have 
streng thened the Alliance on ench of these 
counts. Strength, closeness, trust, realism, 
fieltlblllty-these wlll be useful assets as we 
m ove toward the new hopes and new pos-
slbllllles or the "ern of negotlntlon." 
SENATE RESOLUTION 292-SUDMISSION OF A 
SENATE RESOLUTION RELATING TO SUDSTAN-
TIAL REDUCTION OF U.S. FoRCES PERMANENT-
LY STATIONED IN EUROPE 
Mr.li1ANSFIELD. Mr. President, at this time 
this country has 429 major bases overseas 
and 2.297 Jesser bases. These bases cover 
40.000 square miles and are located In 30 
countries . Stationed on these basese are 1,-
750,000 servicemen, families, and foreign em-
ployees, and the cost of matntalnlng these 
b ases Is approximately $4.8 blllion a year. 
lllr. President, I would like to discuss one 
area In which we have a large number of 
ba.ses and an extraordinarily large number o! 
troops, namely, Western Europe. 
On January 19, 1967, I submitted Senate 
Resolution 49 which expressed the sense of 
the Senate that "a substantial resolution or 
U .S . forces permanently stationed In Europe 
can be made without adversely a.Jlectlng 
either our resolve or ability to meet our com-
mitment undCT the North Atlantic Treaty." 
I wish to Introduce an Identical resolution 
again today and ask unanimous consent 
that Its text be printed tn the RECORD at 
the conclusion of my remarks and that the 
resolution be referred to both the Committee 
on Foreign Relations and the Armed Serv-
Ices Co nun! ttee. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The resolution Wlll 
be received and referred to the Committee 
on Foreign Relations and the Armed Serv-
Ices Comm.lttee; and, without objection, the 
resolution will be printed In the RECORD. 
(See exhibit 1.) 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, we have had 
several hundred thousand men In uniform 
sta tioned In Europe since 1951 when Presi-
dent TrUman, responding to the then exist-
Ing situation and to a Senate sense resol u tlon 
of that day, announced the first substantial 
p ost-World War II Increase In U.S. forces 
there. When Senate Resolution 49 was Intro-
duced 2 years ago there were about 372,000 
mlll t.'try personnel In Europe, Including TUr-
k ey, Spain, n.nd the 6th Fleet In the Mediter-
r anean; this force was accompanied by some 
240,000 dependents, a grand total of 612,000. 
There are now about 315,000 men--a good 
r eduction- and they are acoompa.nlcd by 
235,000 dependents-not a good enough re-
duction- and 14,000 clvlllans employed by 
the U.S . Government. Thus, there are over 
550,000 Amer1cans In Europe today who are 
ei ther In military service or associated wtth 
the military, n.nd matntalned wholly or large-
ly by the Government of the United States. 
We now have, overall, about 3.5 million 
men under arms. Of this total, about 1.2 
m illion are stationed outside the United 
:n .. ' "~ PN'rrt'tlin~ ,,.., -:\~>Mil l',.."' ldPd by t.hc 
L'<lJKtr•.men~ ~ DcfeDBe. In a<!<UUI>n h> th06t> 
In Europe, there Is a force of about 479,500 In 
Vietnam. 
May- I say. parenthetically, that as of last 
Thursday, this Is 4,500 In excess of the 60,000 
announced withdrawal by the President of 
the United States. a withdrawal whlch was to 
be met by December 15. 1969. Thus, I congrat-
ulate the Pres! dent for going beyond the 
60,000 mark. I hope that this Is a continua-
tion of n policy which, perhaps, may not be 
announced but which wtll be continued tn 
effect, to the end that more and more troops 
can be wtthdrawn as appropriately as possible 
from Vietnam and all of Southeast Asia. 
There arc 129 ,000 In the fleets abroad, 
58,000 In Korea, 45,000 In Thailand, 42,000 on 
Okinawa, another 40,000 In Japan, 28,000 In 
the Philippines, 24,000 In Latin America, 
10,000 In North Africa and the Middle East 
and another 10,000 In Canada, Greenland, 
and Iceland. 
This commitment of men nbroad obviously 
represents an enormous cost to tl1e people of 
the United States. It Is reflected In a mili-
tary budget of some $00 billion and In the 
tax rn,te<S. It Is nlso reflected In n bn,lance-of-
payments deficit which amounted to $1.3 
billion In the first qunrtcr of this year. 
Our net foreign exchnngo gap with Ger-
many alone Is now running at about $965 
m1lllon per annum. This Is the highest fig-
ure to date. In 1968, the figure wn.s $887.4 
million. It had been between $700 and $800 
million In the period 1963 through 1967, and 
under $700 ml\11on In the years before 1963. 
In the past, part of this exchange gap has 
been covered through various ngreements 
wtth the West German Government. In fis-
cal years 1962 through 1965 these so-called 
offset agreements consisted simply of com-
mitments by the West German Government 
to procure military equipment 1n the United 
States. The agreement for fiscal years 1966 
and 1967 provided for mllltary procurement 
plus the prepayment of a West German debt. 
The fiscal year 1968 agreement provided for 
mllltary procurement plus purchase of spe-
cial medium-term U.S. Treasury securities 
by the West German Government. In fiscal 
year 1969 the agreement provided for mili-
tary procurement plus the purchase of ape-
elM U.S. Treasury securities by the West 
German Government, plus additional pur-
chases of U.S. Treasury securities by West 
German banks plus an agreement by Luft-
hansa to finance purchases of aircraft. 
I have had the Library of Congress draw 
up a table showtng the terms of these so-
called offset agreements between the United 
States and West Germany tn fiscal years 
1962 through 1969 and ask unantmous con-
sent that It be pr1nted In the RECORD at the 
conclusion of my remarks. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, 
it is so ordered. 
(See exhibit 2.) 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, agreement 
was reached wtth the West German Govern-
ment on July 9 covering fiscal years 1970 
and 1971. The agreement provides for an In-
flow of foreign exchange In the amount of 
$1.52 billion over the next 2 years. In addi-
tion to m111tary procurement In the United 
States, the agreement provides for a West 
German Government loan, plus retention 
In the United States for 2 years of Interest 
earned by West Germany on U.S. Treasury 
deposits, plus the purchase by West Ger-
many of U.S. Export-Import Bank and Mar-
shall Plan loans, plus West German civil 
procurement In the United States, plus pay-
ment to a furid In the Unl ted States for en-
couraging German Investment plus advance 
transfers for debt repayment by the West 
German Government to the United States. A 
concesslonal Interest rate of 3.5 percent 
will apply to the West German Government 
loan and to certain deposits in the U.S. 
Treasury for military procurement. I ask 
\lll:tnltn<lu" conecnt that the tt'xt ot n pron•1 
rel~Wtt> lhllell l>y t.ho Ol'pi\l'tmcnt ot l:lt"to on 
July 9, giving the terms of the agreement, 
be prtnted tn the RECORD at this point. 
There being no objection, the press release 
was ordered to be printed In the RECORD, 118 
follows: 
11PRESS STATEMENT 
"The U.S. and German delegations an-
nounced today the conclusion of a new agree-
ment for offsetting foreign exchange costs of 
American forces In Germany for U.S. Fiscal 
Years 1970 and 1971. The delegations have 
been conferring In Washington this week 
on the third and concluding round of their 
talks. 
"The agreement provides for an Inflow of 
foreign exchange to the U.S. In the amount 
of 1.52 bllllon dollars. These Inflows wlll be 
achieved by $925 mllllon or procurement of 
U.S. goods and services (61% of total agree-
ment) and $595 million o! financial meM-
ures (39% of totnl). 
"Details nre as follows: 
" [In mllllons o! dollars] 
"Military procurement In the 
United States__________________ 800.00 
Federal Republic of Germany Joan 
to the U.S. (repayable after ten 
years) ---------------- -- - --- - - 250. 00 
Purchase by Federal Republic of 
Germany of loans held In port-
folio of Eximbank and of out-
standing Marshall Plan Loans__ 118. 75 
Civil procurement In the United 
States by Federal Republic of 
Germany---------------------- 125. 00 
Creation of fund In U.S. by Fed-
eral Republic of Germany to 
encourage German Investment 
In United States________________ 150. 00 
Advance transfers by the Federal 
Republic of Germany for debt 
repayment to the United States__ 43. 75 
Retention In the United States of 
Interest earned by the Federal 
Republic of Germany on U.S. 
Treasury deposits______________ 32.50 
Total 1,520.00 
"It was agreed that the Interest rate which 
would apply to the Inter-government loan 
and to certain Federal Republic of Germany 
deposits In the U.S. Treasury for procure-
ment would be 3.5 percent. 
"The Export-Import Bank n.nd Marshall 
Plan Jonns purchased by the Federal Re-
public of Germany would bear, on the aver-
age, a rate of Interest at four percent with 
respect to certain loans and five percent 
with respect to others. 
"The U.S. delegation was led by Deputy 
Under Secretary of State Nathaniel Samuels; 
the German delegation was headed by State 
Secretary Guenther Harkort o! the For-
eign Office." 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I would 
like to make several comments on the agree-
ment. Before doing so, I should note that 
the Department of State apparently believes 
that this agreement represents a consider-
able Improvement over previous agreements. 
To be sure, the amount of the military pro-
curement Is greater that last year, or the 
previous years. The borrowing by the United 
States Is for a longer period than In the 
past and a concesslona.l rate will apply to 
the West German Government's loan. The 
total amount Is higher than ever before and 
the agreement Is !or 2 years Instead of only 
one. 
In those respecta there has been "Improve-
ment." It would be well to bear In mind, 
however, that there Is another side o! the 
coin. While the amount of foreign exchange 
Inflow tnvolved 1.s higher, so Is the !orelgn 
exchange gap because It becomes more ex-
pensive every year to keep our forces In 
Germany. With the reevaluation of the Ger-
mn.n mn.rk, mflrC()VOr, thtA ,xpcns~ st.atto~"'l In 
dollllrll Will '"'"•lit!<! ll¥,1ihl, fi,f/l , Y""'''1·''Y· 
'~ •. r' 
)'· .. 
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more drnstlcA.Ily thnn In the pA.St. Further-
more, the agreement represente only about 
80 percent or the foreign exchange outflow 
from the United Statoo to Germany in the 
coming 2 Osca.l yeat'8. And, while the Weet 
German Government loan to the United 
Stotes wlll cA.rry a concesslonA.l lntCTest rate 
or 3.6 percent, nevertheless It represente an 
obllgntlon or the UnJ ted States whlch must 
bo renewed or re<ieemed; tho lntrrcst will 
rr"ult In some nnnunl cnpltn.l outflow and 
the cnpltnl or tho loan Itself mUBt be r&-
gnrded ns, eventunlly, B lA.rge Item of out-
flow. Flnnlly, since the agreement Is !or a 
2-year period, It mny Imply a commitment 
on our pnrt to retoln substnntlA.lly the pres-
ent level o! U.S. forces In Germany for tJ1e 
next 2 years whether or not that should 
prove desirable or In acoord with our na-
tlonnl needs now or a yea.r from now. In 
fnct, the new West Oermnn Chnncellor said 
In nn Interview 1n the November 14 Issue o! 
Tlmo mngnzlne thnt there was "nn under-
~lnndlng on both sides," when nrgwnen.t 
wns rcnch~d 001 nn olf8Ct arrangement for 
the next 2 yenrs, that there would be no 
"subs\.nntlnl chnnges" In the level· or U.S. 
forces during this period. 
No mnttor how tJ1e current agreement Is 
regA.rded, tJ1ere Is no ese&plng the !act thnt 
the n.-slgnment of U.S. milltory forces 1n 
Germnny n.nd Europe Is a voraolous consumer 
or U.S. resources, n source or lnfintlon e.nd, 
In present clrc111tL•te.ncoo, a factor 1n the 
reduction In the lntematlone.I strength or 
the dol!M. 
It Is a cliche to say that the Un1 ted States 
Is a rich and powerful country. Alter the 
long drnln on Vlctnnm, however, It may be 
wise to take another look at tJll\t glib asser-
tion. In tenns or surplUB for necessary na-
tlonnl purposes Bt homo and abroad, we 
nre begtnnlng to scrape the bottom or the 
barrel. 
Other nations have come to reallze thnt 
If they Bre to accomplish the essentlnl tasks 
at home, Lt may be necessary to concentrate 
on only the essential tMks abrond. In my 
judgment, It Is long pnst time for us to !ace 
the facts of our sl tuatlon and reach the same 
conclusion. In this connection, I welcome 
the Presldt-nt's July 9 order to reduce the 
number o! mllltnry men biiSed abroad by 
14,900--i\lso hls most recent order or the day 
or so ngo In which npproxlmately another 
14,000, nlmost all In tho Pnclflc area, will be 
reduced lnsofnr M our Armed Forces are 
concerned-nltJ10Ugh In my Judgment It Le 
regrettnblo that the re<iuctlon Is so llnUted 
nnd thnt the forces committed to NATO have 
been completely exempted from thLs out 1n 
rn1lltary forces overscM. 
On April 15, 1 ho.d printed In the RECORD 
the defense policy stntement mo.de by the 
Canadian Prime Minister on Aprtl 3. In that · 
statement, Prime Minister Trudeau enid: 
"NATO Itself Is continuously reassessing 
the role It plnys In the light of changtng 
world condl tiona. Perhaps the mnJor dcvel· 
opment arrcctlng NATO In Europe lrtnce the 
orgnnlzntlon was founded Is the magnificent 
recovery or the economic strength of West-
ern Europe. Thcro hna been a very great 
chn nge In the nblll ty or European countries 
themselves to provide necessnry conven tlonol 
defense forces nnd armnmcnts to be de-
ployed by the alliance In Europe. 
"It wns, therefore, In our view entirely ap-
proprlnto for Cnnndn to review and re-exnm· 
tne tho nccrAqiLy In preoent olrcumstnnces 
!or malntnlnlng Cnnncllnn forceR In WooLcrn 
• Europo. Cnnntllnn forces nre now committed 
to NATO until the end or the present yenr. 
The Canadian force commitment !or deploy-
ment with NATO In Europe beyond this 
period Will be discussed with our nllles at 
the Do!ense Plnnnlng Committee meeting 
ln Mny. 'I'lle Onnn!lll\!1 oovernmrnt Intends, 
In ron!'11lt.~t~M mt.b ~nndl\'~ fl.lll!'ll, to ~ko 
_..._.~  k" h't~ ato.;'"' A J'lAIII\C'Il lllld 
phased reduction o! the size of the Ca-
nndlan forces In Europe." . 
According to press reports, which I under-
stand to be accurate, the present plan Is 
to reduce the nwnber of the Cano.diBn con-
tingent o! about 10,000 In Western Germany 
to about 4,000. This La a small reduction 1n 
numbers but a. large reduction In percent-
age nnd would seem to represent, In effect, 
B change In tho Cnnadlan estimate of the 
situation In Europe, ns well M a revision 
of policy on the part of the Canadlnn Gov-
ernment. I would hope this Nation would 
study the Cnnadlan action most cnrefully. 
To me, It seems an adjustment which looks 
to the future Instead or to the past. 
Lo.st year at this time, we too, nppeared 
to be on the verge of moving In the same 
direction. There was widespread support In 
the Senate for a proposal by the dlstln-
gulahed Senntor from Missouri (Mr. SYM-
INGTON) which would have had the effect 
of lowering substantially the level of our 
forces In Europe. Most regrettably, there WA.S 
the occupation of Czechoslovakia on August 
20 by 400,000 Soviet and other WBrsaw Pact 
forces. The tlme was one o! extreme un-
certainty, with various obscure troop move-
mente In Enatern Europe. It was fM' from 
elear that the relatl vely bloodless coup In 
CzechoslovakiA. would mark the culrn1natlon 
of tWa activity. There Wl\8 fear thBt tho dif-
ficulties In Enstern Europe might spread 
throughout Europe. 
As I stated at thnt time, a subs tan tlBl re-
duction In U.S. Forces In Europe In those clr-
cumstnnces could have been subJect to mla-
lnterpretntlon In the East. and brought grave 
uncertainty In the West. I o.dded, however, 
thnt, In my judgment, It remained desirable 
to undertake a gradual reduction In U.S. 
forces If and when the situation In Enstern 
Europe offered reasonable assurance thnt de-
velopments there were not going to splll over 
Into Western Europe. It seems to me thnt 
thnt time has now arrived. The Soviet Union 
!nces serious problems In Czechostovnkla and 
elsewhere In Eo.stern Europe. II thnt were not 
enough, there Is a difficult sitUAtion to the 
Enat on the Soviet-Chinese border, Soviet 
troops In Ozeolloslovakln, moreover, have 
been cut !rom several hundred thousand to 
about 70,000. While It Is regrettable that 
the lnternnl polltlcnl life or that enlightened 
nation Ia agnln dlctnted by a foreign power, 
certoln renlltlca ns they benr upon our mili-
tary presence In Europe mu11t be !need. What 
transpired In Czechoslovakia was not eon-
trollA.ble 1n o.ny fashion by NATO and benrs 
no direct relntJonshlp to the quest ion or the 
size o! Amerlcnn forces assigned In Europe 
to that organization. Hnd there been only one 
or two divisions or, for that matter, seven or 
eight or 18 divisions or Americans In West-
ern Germany, lnsteo.d or four or five, would 
they have had any different effect on the 
situation ns It developed In CzechoslovakiA. 
!nat year? I cnn find no biiSis for any such 
contention. Events within Eastern Europe 
are, na they have been since the Hungarian 
Interlude made appnrent tor all to see more 
tthan a decnde ngo, beyond the direct reach 
ot the North Atlnntlc Trenty nnd the military 
structure or NATO. 
Nevcrthele~s. It will bo argued, ns It Is al-
ways nrgued, that the time Is not right to 
mnke a substnntlnl reduction or our forces 
In Europe. But It seems that the time Is 
never rlgh t. I am aware of the recent press 
reports, tor exnmple, Implying thnt NATO 
mny be on the point o! mnklng a proposnl 
to the Soviet Union and Its Wnrsnw Pact 
allies for negotlntlons on reducing conven-
tional forces In Europe. I would like to point. 
out, however, that NATO hill! been studying 
the subject o! bnlanced force reductions for 
years. My undorotandlng Is that there Is still 
no ngreod NATO proposal !or batanoOd !orce 
J'(!ductlona 111\d 1• Is not planned that thore 
Will lit OliO \lntll M IOMt Mrl)' In tltO 111m• 
mer. Even then, there Is no renson to assume 
that discussions, much less full negotlntlons, 
will begin, for there has been no Indication, 
direct or Indirect, that the Soviet Union Is 
interested In such discussions. I 
It will also be argued, as It Is always nrgued, 
that bringing a substantial number or forces .. 
back from Europe Will not arrect our defense 
budget because we cannot r educe the number 
of men under nrms. But It Is also nrgued 
that It Is not possible to reduce the number 
of men under anna because or the need to 
meet our NATO and other overseas commit-
ments. This endless circle lending, In the end 
to fiscal exlll\u.stlon can and must be broken. 
I am not now ndvocntlng, and I have not 
In the pnst advocnted, that all U.S. troope be 
removed from Europe. Our vital Interest In 
what trnnsplres In Europe remains and a 
U.S. presence should remain. In this day e.nd 
age an armed attack on Western Europe will 
certainly Involve us almost from the outlret. 
It Is to our Interest, therefore, that we nre 
pre~elllt before tho outset. Thnt need co.n be 
met, in my judgment, nnd should be met 
With a much smaller rn1lltnry force. 
At tho snme time, a subsbnntlal reduction 
of our forces In Europe would have certain 
Immediately beneficlnl etrecte on thls Nation. 
In the first place, tho balance or pnyments 
should soon reflect A. sharp d ecrease In out-
flow for rn11l tary purposes, even as It becomes 
po!;s1ble to bring a-bout a reduction In the 
Natlonnl military budget. In the second place, 
a reducblon In U.S. forces In Western Europe 
might provide some Impetus for Western 
Europenns to develop their own defense er-
forte 1n line with their needs and to work 
together more closely In doing so. Integrated 
defense Is supposed to be what NATO Is all 
about. To the extent thnt we hA.ve continued 
to overpartlclpate In the defense of Europe, 
it follo~ tbnt there has been fBr less lnter-
eet In bearing the burdens or that defense 
a.mong the European themselves. 
Finally, a substantial reduction of Amer-
lcnn forces would help to correot whnt I re-
gard 1\8 a distorted relationship between 
Europe and the United Stntes. The Soviet 
Union ma.lnt .. lne hnlf a million Aoldlers In 
Elll!tcrn Europe. While the Russlnns mny 
!\Scribe this presence to " threat from the 
West, the !net Is that the Soviet presence Is 
also a slgnlficnnt fnctor In maintaining com· 
m'\tn1st governments In power, as Czech oslo-
vakln has so clenrly Illustrated. The democ-
racies have no need of U.S. forces In order 
to mnlntaln them~elves within the nations 
of Western Europe; yet, thnt most significant 
political fact Is disguised by our military 
presence In such great magnitude. 
In my judgment, It Is not B dc.slmble 
sl tuatlon !or a foreign power el ther In 
Eastern Europe or Western Europe to keep 
someWhere In the neighborhood or a million 
men In these two cnmps, n quarter a! a cen-
tury roter the events which Initially put 
them there. Both contingents are ~omewhat 
annchronlstlc, to so.y the len,st. Yet the con-
tinuing presen<'o or t he one hM become the 
principal basis !or the continuing presence 
o! tho other. Tho persistence or the nnnch-
ronlsm lends not only to a distortion or 
pollLical relntlonshlps, but to n distortion of 
economic relntlonshlp~. Indeed, the annunl 
orrset negotiation with the West German 
Government Is n cnse very much In point. 
West Germany Is, In errect, becoming n major 
banker for this Nn-t lon In order that we may 
pny for tho continued mnln tennnce or U.S. 
forces In Orrmnny nt this Nrttlon'a expen•r. 
In short, the presence or Amerlcnn forces 
In Europe In such lnrge numbers, In my jutlg-
ment, hns velltlges, It not of empire In a lOth 
century sense, then af rn1ll tnry occupation 
nnd of the costly cold Wll.l' and of the one-
time complete preeminence o! the dollar In 
1nternn.ttono.l finance. Yet the a.ge of empire, 
the era ot occtrpa~lon, the period of thll Mld 
Wl\f llMtl 0Mf!•nlt1'!d 0111\Milfal pr~~I~De« t:te 
" 
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of the pll..St. The per~l:;tcnco of tb~sc vestiges 
In prl"'ent poJJcles Involves, Jn my judgment, 
a wnsteful and dangcrolL9 use of our avn.lln.ble 
resource!!. It n.ct.s to d cbll1tate this Nation's 
capn.clt.y, bOth at b orne and abroad, to deal 
with the urgent problems a! the contempo· 
ro.ry era. 
"F.XHIOTT 2 
"S. R>.s. 292 
"Wherens the ! orelp;n policy and m!Utory 
Pirrur,t.ll of tJtc Unit-ed Stntgs aro dNllco.trd 
to the prot<-c-tlon o! our nntlonnl 6ecur!l.y, 
thn pr~c~rrnt.Jon of the Ubcriles of the 
J\morlcnn prop!<'. 1\lld the ml\lntenrmce of 
world P"·'ce; n.nll 
"1-\"hcrcns the United States, In Implement-
Ing these princlple.9, hl\9 nHtlnt.'\lned large 
conttngcnw of American Anned Forces In 
, Europe, l;of;rthcr with air 1\lld naval units, 
for twenty years; and 
"Wherrns the security of tho United St.ates 
nne! lt8 cltl7,cns reml\1.111! Interwoven with 
tho nreurlty of othN n ations s lgnl\tory to 
th" North IH!ttntlc Treftty M It WfLS when 
t he tren.ty wn.~ BlgnNi, but the conllltlon of 
our Europcctn nlllea. both economlcnlly and 
mtllt.ctrlJy, hn.s nppreclnbly Improved since 
l ttrf:O contingt'nts of forces were deployed; 
and 
"Wh~rt>M the m cnn.s nnd cnpncLty or a ll 
m~mn~rs Of t!Jc North Atln.ntlc Trcnty Or· 
gnntc.o.t Jon t.o provld~ forces to res is t aggreR-
•Ion !ln.• sl!~nlficnn tly Improved since the 
ortr·tn"l United l:>tntc-s dcploymt'nt: nnd 
"W!l!'rcns the corrnnltmrnt by nil members 
or the North Atlant ic Treaty ls bnsell upon 
th<' full coopern.tlon of nil trcnt.y pn.rt ners In 
cont.rlhut.Jnr, n1nterlnlA a.nd ntPn on n. fair £Uld 
equltnbl<' bu.siR. but such cont.rlbutlons hnve 
not bc<'n forthcoming from nJl other mem· 
bcrs of tho orgm>IZ!l:\lon; and 
"Wl1erens reln.tlollll between Enstcrn Europe 
nnd W~:;tern Europe were ten~c when the 
largo contlngents of United Sta.tes forcoo 
wert' deployrd In Europe but this sltuntlon 
h n9 now undergone substantial chnnge nnd 
r ein tlons between the two pl\rts of Europe 
nre now chnmctcrlzed by 1.\Il lncrenslng two-
"l<ay flow of trudc, people and other pence!ul 
f?Xchange: nnd 
"Whereas the present pollcy of ml\lnta.lntng 
lnrgo contlnt:cntll of United States forces 
and tht>lr d t'pendcnt.s on the European Con-
tlucnt nlso contributes further to the fiscal 
and monetary problems of the United States: 
Now. therefore, be It 
"Resolrcd, That--
"(1) It Is the serL~e o! the Senate, thst with 
chonges and Improvements 1n the techniques 
or modem wnrfare nnd because of the vnst 
1ncresse In capnclty of the United States to 
WAge war and to move mlllt.a.ry forces a.nd 
equipment by air, a substantial reduction of 
Untt<>d States force~J permanently stationed 
In Europe ca.n be mnde without adversely 
affecting eltller our resolve or n.blllty to meet 
our commitment under the North Atlantic 
Tr~aty; 
"(2) S . Res. 09, adopted 1n the Sennte 
Apt II 4, 195 I, L• amended bO contain tho 
provlnlnllfl o f t.hl~ rr·:olutlon and, where tho 
t P•;O)\Ji.(ft11fl J)tf\y ('OIIf!lf•t., tliO prl'n(•nt fl'nOIU• 
lion lfl ('OIIIrolllllg M to thO AOIIfiO O( tho 
"7't•rut.• of off.•l't artrl'eWr71 t ,, bctwrra the 
U111trd States and WeAtern Germany, /16• 
cal 1962-1969 
" [In millions of dollars 1 
A(!l·eetl. 
tarrtet 
payments 
"Fiscal ycors anll terms n.greed by 
Western Germany: 
1962·1963, Military procurement by 
West Gcnmmy from the United 
Stl\tes ------------------------- 1, 875 
10Gl-1965 ~UIItnry procurement by 
\\'est Germany !rom the United 
Stntes ------------·-----·-·---· 1, 375 
Agreed 
target 
payment6 
1066-11167, Mlllt.ary procurement by 
Wes t Germn.ny from the United 
States plus prepayment of West 
Germnn debt to the United Statea 
In the amount of $192 million ••.. 1, 350 
1068, Military procurement by Wes t 
Gcrmsny from t-he United States. 100 
10613, Purchase by West Germ(IJ1y of 
special U.S. 'l'rensury securlt.les__ 500 
l~tnl ------------------------ 600 
1908, Wes t Germn.ny agreed that 
the Bundesbank would continue 
Its practice of not converting dol-
lars into gold. 
1969, l\1111 tary procurement by West 
Germany from the Untted Sta.t<>s.. 100 
1969, Purcllnse by West Gcnmmy of 
specln.l U.S. Trensury securities__ 600 
1969, Purchase of U.S. Trcnsury se. 
curl ties by West Germnn banks.. 125 
Totnl ---- - ------------------- 726 
1969. Lu!tl11\111l!\ agreed to finance 
$60 million purchnse of n!rcrnft 
In West Oerm11ony rather thsn 
U.S. rrmrkct." 
Mr. ELLENDER Mr. President, I mn 
In complelc accord \\ith Ute views of Ule 
Sena.tor from Montana. 
F'or IJw pas t 10 ycn.rs I have been ad-
vocat.ing that we should remove our 
troops from Western Europe. It has been 
costing the taxpayer s of our Nation over 
$2 billion annually to hold au umbrella 
of rnllitary protection over our allies in 
that part O'f the world. 
In my humble judgment, 1J1e1·e is no 
reason for keeping them there. It is lr-
1itatlng to our former allies and has the 
tendency of widening the breach be-
tween us and the U.S.S.R. We have beeti 
supporting Western Europe now for over 
20 years, and I sincerely believe that it 
Is long past time t.o move out of t.here. 
If protec tion is needed, which I doubt, 
the countries of that area are well able 
to care for t.hemselves. 
Keeping our troops there tends to 
maintain the fear and suspicion that the 
U.S.S.R. has of us and I have no doubt 
that the Russians will follow suit and re-
move their forces from the countries of 
Eastern Europe. As I have often said in 
the past, when former President De 
Gaulle of France ordered us out of his 
country we should have then and there 
left Europe. 
In my most recent visit to the U.S.S.R., 
In 1968, I have reported to this body 
that I can see no world peace unle~s and 
until we ran dlfl]wl t.he ft'ftr nnd sns-
plrlon t.hn.t now cxlsl.s hdwc<"n ttfl ntH! 
tllo U F.I.S.n.. n.ncl WI' should nwkr rvt'ry 
effort IA:l ncconlttwtlntc our~PlV('fl wll,h Lho 
Russl ltll people. Tl1nt cnn be done with-
out in a.ny manner embracing each 
others philosophy of government. 
.... . 
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